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prudence and the statements of theoretical jurisprudence describing
that object."
Radin narrows the creation of legal norms to one figure only,
the creation of individual norms by the judgment of courts, wrongly
identifying "The Law" with court law. But is an act of congress
not a legal norm? And what about primitive legal orders, as e. g.,
the present international law, which have no compulsory courts? But
even by this narrow focusing of all attention to what the judge de-
cides legal realism is leads to a reductio ad absurduim. For why is
the decision of a judge a legal statement? Obviously only because
the judge is the competent organ of the legal order. How can the
realist from observable behavior tell us that a man is a judge?
Whether a man is a judge or not, can only be decided on the basis
ot legal norms. And finally, there is a fundamental fallacy of con-
fusing the objective contents of a court decision with the physiolog-
ical or psychological processes in the body or mind of the judge. It
is as if someone would tell us that Pythagoras' theorem c2 = a2 + b2
is nothing but the observable behavior of mathematicians.
Professor Radin shows himself again in these lectures as a fine
scholar, an excellent writer, as a man of profound learning and wit;
it is only a pity that so much talent is applied to the defense of a
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This book presents the six lectures -prepared and published
under the dangers of air-and submarine warfare-delivered by Sir
Cecil Thomas Carr, the Editor of "Statutory Rules and Orders",
upon the Carpentier Foundation at Columbia University in 194o.
They deal with various aspects of English administrative law: a
series of lectures, not a treatise. The book shows fine scholarship,
a critical mind and sense of humour.
Administrative law has only lately and rather reluctantly been
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recognized in Britain and in this country; contrary to Continental
Europe, it remained in the common law countries for a long time
terra incognita. This reluctance is based on the fear that delegated
legislation and administrative tribunals may endanger liberty, may
give too much power to the government, encroach upon the courts,
threaten the doctrine of the separation of powers, and create this
institution of bureaucracy, which Lord Palmerstone still could assure
the Queen is a phenomenon exclusively continental. Dicey wrote of
administrative law as something alien and continental. But, notwith-
standing all that, administrative agencies with legislative and judicial
functions have sprung up in Britain and America and are growing
in importance; and they have sprung up long ago.
The first lecture deals with what Sir Cecil calls England's "New
Deal" in the eighteen thirties, the Factories Act, creating factory
inspectors, the Poor Law Board, the General Board of Health. Apart
from some remarks on legislative drafting and on bureaucracy, the
author deals primarily with the problems of delegated legislation and
aministrative tribunals. Also with regard to these two particular
problems of administrative law, Sir Cecil, with a typical English
suspicion against theory, does not give us a theory, but discusses
practical problems. He shows not only that delegated legislation and
administrative tribunals are, for many reasons, simply unavoidable,
but also that they do not threaten the Rule of Law, if certain con-
ditions are fulfilled and certain safeguards provided. This is par-
ticularly shown with regard to the four great Emergency Acts of
this century in Britain, the latest being the Emergency Powers (De-
fense) Act of 1939. Crisis legislation certainly means more gov-
ernment and less liberty. He concedes that "intensive regimentation
and restrictions, impatient suppression of heterodox views, intern-
ment of dissentients . . . are steps toward dictatorship, even when
taken along a lawful and constitutional road" and that "the most
successful dictator is he who gains his power without forsaking this
road." But free peoples temporarily surrendering freedom "will
expect their inheritance restored to them when the storm is over."
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